The War

[Highlander]

(1)  Saying that unconditional surrender was the end point does not lead to say the outcome was not in question.  It says that we, as a group, are in it to the end.  Say France could drop out once the Geman army was out of France instead of to the end or England will crease its efforts once it feels that Germany is no longer a threat.

(2) If the allies felt that Normandy was a done deal then why the concern about failure expressed by Eisenhower?  Much can go wrong during that large of an operation and if it did fail it would have been many months until another invasion would have taken place.  And again, looking back one could say Germany was done but during the time there were many that were still concerned about Germany's capacity to wage war.

I did not want to turn this into a lengthy discussion which is why I deleted my last post.  By 1942, the fact that the allies would prevail was really no longer in doubt;  most historians would agree to this (see Gretz's comments).  The way the war was going to be prosecuted was still a question and that doesn't  mean it was going to be easy and that the costs were not going to be enormous and that it would it not take time, but excepting a complete loss of allied will which was not going to happen, the outcome was certain.  The resources that could be thrown against the axis were just too overwhelming.

I did not say that the allies regarded Normandy as a done deal.  I am sure there was doubt and they knew it was going to be costly.  My point is that the Germans simply did not have the capacity to throw the anglo-americans back into the sea.  Read the historical accounts of Germans who served in Normandy, daylight movement was nil impossible; they simply could not mount effective offensive operations and failed miserably when they tried.  By the time of Normandy, the Soviets were rolling in the east.  They destroyed much of the German Army in east in the summer of 1944 and the way was open for the Soviets to roll through Poland and into Germany.  The only thing really in question regarding the outcome of the war (although not realized quite yet by the US) was how much of Europe the US and Britain could salvage from the Soviets. This is why Eisenhauer eventually diverted troops away from the Berlin axis in 1945 to cutoff the Soviet advance towards Denmark (the US was alerted by the Swedes that Stalin wanted to bring Denmark into the Soviet sphere of influence in the post war world).     

[NDTeve]

I did not want to turn this into a lengthy discussion which is why I deleted my last post.  By 1942, the fact that the allies would prevail was really no longer in doubt;  most historians would agree to this (see Gretz's comments).  The way the war was going to be prosecuted was still a question and that doesn't  mean it was going to be easy and that the costs were not going to be enormous and that it would it not take time, but excepting a complete loss of allied will which was not going to happen, the outcome was certain.  The resources that could be thrown against the axis were just too overwhelming.

I did not say that the allies regarded Normandy as a done deal.  I am sure there was doubt and they knew it was going to be costly.  My point is that the Germans simply did not have the capacity to throw the anglo-americans back into the sea.  Read the historical accounts of Germans who served in Normandy, daylight movement was nil impossible; they simply could not mount effective offensive operations and failed miserably when they tried.  By the time of Normandy, the Soviets were rolling in the east.  They destroyed much of the German Army in east in the summer of 1944 and the way was open for the Soviets to roll through Poland and into Germany.  The only thing really in question regarding the outcome of the war (although not realized quite yet by the US) was how much of Europe the US and Britain could salvage from the Soviets. This is why Eisenhauer eventually diverted troops away from the Berlin axis in 1945 to cutoff the Soviet advance towards Denmark (the US was alerted by the Swedes that Stalin wanted to bring Denmark into the Soviet sphere of influence in the post war world).     

You're right...after the Russians pushed the Germans back...it was not in doubt. Before then is debateable.

[aknowledgeableperson]

I guess we are not that far apart in what we are saying, mostly in how we are saying it so I will concede that for many the outcome was not in doubt.  Granted, the actual outcome of the war may not have been in much doubt (don't forget the attempted assassination of Hiltler by his army in order to broker a truce) but the length of the war was in doubt.  Many things had to go right for the war in Europe to end when it did.  And given a questionable length of war results in how long the will to fight will exist.  Especially if the war in Europe did last another six months or so Germany would have been able to introduce a few new weapons to its arsenal (at least according to a few programs and articles I have read) and instead of an actual defeat there might have been a truce introduced.

As a side note, Eisenhower did carry a note on him to be released in case the invasion failed which put the decision to invade solely on his shoulders.

Yes, the USA dropped the atom bomb on Japan but would it have dropped one in Europe?

The Soviets didn't participate one bit on the effort in Japan and the British did not til after V-E. 

Oh, by the way the British did fight in Asia.  Not so much in the Pacific but in Burma and other areas on the Asian continent.  Don't forget, a big part of the British Empire was in Asia.  And the Soviets did declare war on Japan and fought in Korea but that was just for a few days before VE day.

[Highlander]

Oh, by the way the British did fight in Asia.  Not so much in the Pacific but in Burma and other areas on the Asian continent.  Don't forget, a big part of the British Empire was in Asia.  And the Soviets did declare war on Japan and fought in Korea but that was just for a few days before VE day.

Actually, the soviet involvement in the east was even more significant than that.  They invaded Manchuria and easily defeated the sizable Japanese ground forces there.  They also went on a land grab occupying southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands which were Japanese territories prior to the war (significant oil has since been found on Sakhalin).  They also had designs on Hokkaido, Japan's second largest home island.  There are some that believe the bomb was dropped to end the war and frustrate Soviet expansionism in the area.  Regardless, the duplicitous soviets had no vested interest in ending the Pacific war when it ended so I really have doubts they would have acted in good faith as a peace broker.     

[LenexatoKCMO]

The use of the bomb was justified particularly that the Japanese would have in fact fought to the last person standing. 

That is certainly what the american propaganda machine hammered on about for fifty + years.  But we will never know if it is true since another choice was taken.  There is certainly plenty of evidence to contradict what you take to be a self-evident fact.  Sure the military fought to the last man and kamakazied on the island battlefields, but would the semi-civilian militias left in their cities have really followed through with the same vigor?  Would the junta have been able to keep decieving the public about the state of the war after the americans landed and would they have been able to maintain control?  If it is such a self-evident fact, why has it been necessary to repeat this mantra over and over again for decades, planting the seed in children's history texts so their formative minds get made up early?  

[BVC]

Oh, by the way the British did fight in Asia.  Not so much in the Pacific but in Burma and other areas on the Asian continent.  Don't forget, a big part of the British Empire was in Asia.  And the Soviets did declare war on Japan and fought in Korea but that was just for a few days before VE day.

The British were involved, true, but VERY insignificantly.  Warships did not appear 11:30 pm, figuratively speaking.  The French, Dutch, and British all had influence in SE Asia but got rolled by the Japanese.  The US fought the Japanese with about 98% of the invasion/liberation forces.  Conversely in Europe we carried the Western theatre and Southern theatre in Italy.  Not to pick on the elitist Euro's but the US and Soviets largely won WWII.

[BVC]

Sure the military fought to the last man and kamakazied on the island battlefields, but would the semi-civilian militias left in their cities have really followed through with the same vigor?  

Well, the mass civilian suicides seem to point directly to what was at hand along with what I have mentioned before if the physical invasion of the homeland proceded.  Tokyo Rose sure got windy spewing "we're ready" in concerns to the citizens fighting the US soldiers once the US took Okinawa.  Look, using the barbarian nature of the Japanese soldiers in their conquests of China, SE Asia, Phillipines, Eastern Russia, etc., one can certainly draw conclusions to support the notions contrary to what you are asserting was simple US propaganda and brainwashing. 

[Steve52]

Anyone who glorifies war probably never fought in one. And I mean fighting not sitting on the sidelines cheering.

[Highlander]

The British were involved, true, but VERY insignificantly.  Warships did not appear 11:30 pm, figuratively speaking.  The French, Dutch, and British all had influence in SE Asia but got rolled by the Japanese.  The US fought the Japanese with about 98% of the invasion/liberation forces.  Conversely in Europe we carried the Western theatre and Southern theatre in Italy.  Not to pick on the elitist Euro's but the US and Soviets largely won WWII.

Uh, the British contibution was significant.  Being a smaller nation, they contributed fewer overall resources but they were in Norway fighting the Germans in 1940, France fighting the Germans in 1940, Crete fighting the Germans in 1941, North Africa 1941-43, Sicily and Italy 1943-1945 (they were not at Cassino but Poles, New Zealanders, Free French and Indian ghurkas were), Normandy (and engaged the greater part of the German army around Caen), Belgium and Holland including spearheading the market garden offensive.  They also fought on the northern edge of the Bulge and advanced on the north flank into Germany with US troops in 1945.  From 43 to 45, they were equal participants in the air war over Germany losing tens of thousands of men in bomber crews.  

That is certainly what the american propaganda machine hammered on about for fifty + years.  But we will never know if it is true since another choice was taken.  There is certainly plenty of evidence to contradict what you take to be a self-evident fact.  Sure the military fought to the last man and kamakazied on the island battlefields, but would the semi-civilian militias left in their cities have really followed through with the same vigor?  Would the junta have been able to keep decieving the public about the state of the war after the americans landed and would they have been able to maintain control?  If it is such a self-evident fact, why has it been necessary to repeat this mantra over and over again for decades, planting the seed in children's history texts so their formative minds get made up early?  

I think you need to read up a bit on what was going on geopolitically in 1945 and within the Japanese government.  Even after 2 atomic bombs fell on Japan, the military was not prepared to give up. On August 9, the day of Nagasaki, the Japanese offered a conditional surrender with the key issue being that the emporer would remain soveriegn and it was rejected by the allies.  The emporer, at that point (well 5 days later), stepped in and agreed to unconventional surrender...partly because of the horror of the bomb and partly because he knew a soviet invasion of Hokkaido was imminent if Japan continued to resist.  It is a historical fact that the military considered a coup and the emporer feared one but in the end the military reluctantly complied.  

At that time, The Japanese Navy and air forces were essentially destroyed and those that remained were conserved for Ketsu Go (suicidal operations).  The Japanese army, however, was intact with 900,000 troops on Kyushu (where the US would have landed).  The Japanese had 120,000 on Okinawa and very few of those survived, so imagine the destructive power of 900,000 dedicated troops.  Everything that the US knew about Japan at the time indicated that the invasion would be incredibly costly.  It's one thing to question the events 60 some years later but we weren't there with our lives on the line, others were.  Japanese recalcitrance and reluctance to surrender is historical fact, not propaganda, documented by historians of many nationalities including Japanese.   I really doubt if anything meaningful has been uncovered to change that historical fact, especially since the Soviets had nothing to gain from negotiating the end of hostilities and everything to lose by ending the war.

[LenexatoKCMO]

I think you need to read up a bit on what was going on geopolitically in 1945 and within the Japanese government.  Even after 2 atomic bombs fell on Japan, the military was not prepared to give up. On August 9, the day of Nagasaki, the Japanese offered a conditional surrender with the key issue being that the emporer would remain soveriegn and it was rejected by the allies.  The emporer, at that point (well 5 days later), stepped in and agreed to unconventional surrender...partly because of the horror of the bomb and partly because he knew a soviet invasion of Hokkaido was imminent if Japan continued to resist.  It is a historical fact that the military considered a coup and the emporer feared one but in the end the military reluctantly complied.  

At that time, The Japanese Navy and air forces were essentially destroyed and those that remained were conserved for Ketsu Go (suicidal operations).  The Japanese army, however, was intact with 900,000 troops on Kyushu (where the US would have landed).  The Japanese had 120,000 on Okinawa and very few of those survived, so imagine the destructive power of 900,000 dedicated troops.  Everything that the US knew about Japan at the time indicated that the invasion would be incredibly costly.  It's one thing to question the events 60 some years later but we weren't there with our lives on the line, others were.  Japanese recalcitrance and reluctance to surrender is historical fact, not propaganda, documented by historians of many nationalities including Japanese.   I really doubt if anything meaningful has been uncovered to change that historical fact, especially since the Soviets had nothing to gain from negotiating the end of hostilities and everything to lose by ending the war.

Historical facts?

It is a fact that MacArthur, Spaatz, Nimitz, and King, as well as Truman's Chief of Staff - Leahy, all argued that it was militarily unnecessary and that the japanese army was on the verge of collapse and/or surrender.  So are we to believe that the military commanders in charge of that theater were all wrong and that the nationalistic history writers were all correct? 

[LenexatoKCMO]

On August 9, the day of Nagasaki, the Japanese offered a conditional surrender with the key issue being that the emporer would remain soveriegn and it was rejected by the allies.

A condition we later accepted by the way.  As MacArthur pointed out - what in the hell was the point?

A Japanese historian has also made an interesting case that the junta's decision to concede defeat actually wasn't even spurred by the bombings but was instead prompted by the conventional soviet victories. 

[Highlander]

Historical facts?

It is a fact that MacArthur, Spaatz, Nimitz, and King, as well as Truman's Chief of Staff - Leahy, all argued that it was militarily unnecessary and that the japanese army was on the verge of collapse and/or surrender.  So are we to believe that the military commanders in charge of that theater were all wrong and that the nationalistic history writers were all correct? 

From what I have read:

Nimitz supported the use of the bomb.  He thought the invasion of Japan was folly because of the cost and when he was told about the bomb he asked if it could be available sooner.  He later agreed with LeMay when Lemay suggested dropping a third bomb on Tokyo.

McCarthur is on record saying the invasion should occur even if the bomb is dropped.  McArthrur actually did disagree with his chief of intelligence who indicated that the invasion of Kyushu was rapidly becoming impossible due to Japanese strength on the island.  McArthur dismissed the intelligence but he also wanted to lead that invasion so, of course, he was going to be optimistic about our chances at a land invasion and dismissive of Japanese strength.

Leahy was in a meeting of Truman's advisors when Truman asked if anyone had any objections about the use of the bomb.  Leahy did not state any objections.  He later advised Truman that the cost of the invasion of Kyushu would be many times worse than Okinawa which was essentially an endorsement of the use of the bomb. 

[BVC]

Uh, the British contibution was significant.  Being a smaller nation, they contributed fewer overall resources but they were in Norway fighting the Germans in 1940, France fighting the Germans in 1940, Crete fighting the Germans in 1941, North Africa 1941-43, Sicily and Italy 1943-1945 (they were not at Cassino but Poles, New Zealanders, Free French and Indian ghurkas were), Normandy (and engaged the greater part of the German army around Caen), Belgium and Holland including spearheading the market garden offensive.  They also fought on the northern edge of the Bulge and advanced on the north flank into Germany with US troops in 1945.  From 43 to 45, they were equal participants in the air war over Germany losing tens of thousands of men in bomber crews.  

Exactly, you're right on with that parallel point made but it's also validates my point that the contribution to the overall war being insignificant in comparison to the US and even the USSR.

[BVC]

A Japanese historian has also made an interesting case that the junta's decision to concede defeat actually wasn't even spurred by the bombings but was instead prompted by the conventional soviet victories. 

That is ludicrous.  How could any historian with a shred of dignity or academic respect suggest that the ability to destroy a city with one bomb paled in comparison to relatively insignificant military defeats? 

[cknab1]

I did not want to turn this into a lengthy discussion which is why I deleted my last post.  By 1942, the fact that the allies would prevail was really no longer in doubt;  most historians would agree to this (see Gretz's comments).  The way the war was going to be prosecuted was still a question and that doesn't  mean it was going to be easy and that the costs were not going to be enormous and that it would it not take time, but excepting a complete loss of allied will which was not going to happen, the outcome was certain.  The resources that could be thrown against the axis were just too overwhelming.

I did not say that the allies regarded Normandy as a done deal.  I am sure there was doubt and they knew it was going to be costly.  My point is that the Germans simply did not have the capacity to throw the anglo-americans back into the sea.  Read the historical accounts of Germans who served in Normandy, daylight movement was nil impossible; they simply could not mount effective offensive operations and failed miserably when they tried.  By the time of Normandy, the Soviets were rolling in the east.  They destroyed much of the German Army in east in the summer of 1944 and the way was open for the Soviets to roll through Poland and into Germany.  The only thing really in question regarding the outcome of the war (although not realized quite yet by the US) was how much of Europe the US and Britain could salvage from the Soviets. This is why Eisenhauer eventually diverted troops away from the Berlin axis in 1945 to cutoff the Soviet advance towards Denmark (the US was alerted by the Swedes that Stalin wanted to bring Denmark into the Soviet sphere of influence in the post war world).     

This comment and all the others you have posted shows you are well versed in this area.  I would have posted much the same except I'm in Chihuahua for the week and drinking mucho tequila.  Stick to your guns. Back even being here, I still check the good old KC Rag

[LenexatoKCMO]

From what I have read:

Nimitz supported the use of the bomb.  He thought the invasion of Japan was folly because of the cost and when he was told about the bomb he asked if it could be available sooner.  He later agreed with LeMay when Lemay suggested dropping a third bomb on Tokyo.

"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

Leahy was in a meeting of Truman's advisors when Truman asked if anyone had any objections about the use of the bomb.  Leahy did not state any objections.  He later advised Truman that the cost of the invasion of Kyushu would be many times worse than Okinawa which was essentially an endorsement of the use of the bomb. 

"The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.

And in perhaps one of the only instances in which I will ever agree with the worst president of the modern era -

"In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives."  then General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

[LenexatoKCMO]

That is ludicrous.  How could any historian with a shred of dignity or academic respect suggest that the ability to destroy a city with one bomb paled in comparison to relatively insignificant military defeats? 

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

You are looking at it from the american perspective.  If you are a japanese general who treats the military as a religion, is it really all that hard to believe that you might be more intimidated by large chunks of your force being anhilated by a superior army with little effective resistance than you are of the mass death of civilians?

[BVC]

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

You are looking at it from the american perspective.  If you are a japanese general who treats the military as a religion, is it really all that hard to believe that you might be more intimidated by large chunks of your force being anhilated by a superior army with little effective resistance than you are of the mass death of civilians?

Not trying to pick on you directly/personally by the way...

There is no doubt my outlook is influenced from being born in America and a fourth generation American but that is no more narrow than the Japanese author's perspective.  However, from a sheer destructive standpoint, the atomic bomb drops on Nagasaki and Hiroshima can in no way be minimalized by anything but a narrow, Japanese perspective of military as religion as you assert. 

[Highlander]

"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

"The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.

And in perhaps one of the only instances in which I will ever agree with the worst president of the modern era -

"In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives."  then General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Here's what  Winston Churchill had to say in  March 1945 not too long after the bombing of Dresden: "It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed.  The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of allied bombing. .....  I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives such as oil and communications ... rather than mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive."  It would almost appear that Churchill was questioning the merits and morality of the bombing campaign against Germany.  Truth is, Churchill was a strong supporter and one of the architects of the campaign but he was distancing himself politically from the carnage as the end of the war became imminent.  My point is that the comments by Nimitz and Leahy were made in retrospect after the fact.  By 1945, Churchill himself was already questioning what he strongly supported a few years earlier and Americans who prosecuted the war were also given to changes of an opinion that they may have held earlier.  At the time, neither of those men went on record as opposing the use of the bomb against Japan, either they remained silent or they believed it was warranted.  Practically everyone in the military believed Japan would either have to be invaded or conventionally bombed into submission. 

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

You are looking at it from the american perspective.  If you are a japanese general who treats the military as a religion, is it really all that hard to believe that you might be more intimidated by large chunks of your force being anhilated by a superior army with little effective resistance than you are of the mass death of civilians?

 

From a Japanese perspective, why did they then not surrender after the Imperial Navy was destroyed and large formations of men killed in the Gaudalcanal, Burma, the Philippines, New Guinea and Okinawa?  The Soviets did play a role in Japanese surrender when they occupied Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and had their eyes on Hokkaido, one of the home islands.  Along with the bomb, the loss of Hokkaido forever was too much for the emperor to contemplate.   

[LenexatoKCMO]

I guess my overall point here is that there are two sides of the coin and lots of evidence and supposition to support both positions.  I wouldn't say that I am 100% convinced it was the wrong decision, but I also would also say it is a mistake for our nation to blindly continue under the mantra that it was obviously the only acceptable decision.  There was clearly a nationalistic effort to attempt to obliterate any second guessing of the decision for decades and that alone is enough to raise suspicions.  It was one of the most significant decisions in the history of our country and Japan, so I feel it would be a tremendous mistake not to coninue applying critical analysis.